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Truly inefficient or providing better quality of care? i
Abstract
Accounting for variation in the quality of care is a major challenge for the assessment of hospital cost
performance. Because data on patients health improvement are generally not available, existing
studies have resorted to inherently incomplete outcome measures such as mortality or re-admission
rates. This opens up the possibility that providers of high quality care are falsely deemed inefficient
and vice versa.
This study makes use of a novel dataset of routinely collected patient-reported outcomes measures
(PROMs) to i) assess the degree to which cost variation is associated with variation in patients health
gain and ii) explore how far judgement about hospital cost performance changes when health
outcomes are accounted for. We use multilevel modelling to address the clustering of patients in
providers and isolate unexplained cost variation.
Our results provide some evidence of a U-shaped relationship between risk-adjusted costs and
outcomes for hip replacement surgery. For the other three investigated procedures, the estimated
relationship is sensitive to the choice of PROM instrument. We do not observe substantial changes in
estimates of cost performance when outcomes are explicitly accounted for.
Keywords: hospital costs, efficiency, patient outcomes, PROMs, cost-quality relationship
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1. Introduction
Any health system that aims to make the best use of its scarce resources will be concerned about
variations in costs between different providers of the same health care. If providers can reduce costs
to the level of best practice, resources might be released to provide benefits elsewhere. But in
analysing variations in provision, it is important to ensure that an assessment of best practice includes
not just costs but also patient outcomes. High costs are not always simply due to inefficiency and may
be associated with better outcomes. Low costs may sometimes be a symptom of low quality care
leading to poor outcomes.
Comparative cost analysis in a multiple regression framework can help to address the question of
which variation in cost is justifiable (Keeler, 1990). By benchmarking providers against each other on
the basis of their observed costs, a regulator can gain insights into the cost structure and identify the
resource implications of heterogeneity (Shleifer, 1985). Over the past three decades, several hundred
studies have conducted comparative analyses of hospital costs (Hollingsworth, 2008). While these
have contributed to a better understanding of provider heterogeneity with respect to patient case-mix
and production constraints, they have not convincingly addressed the issue of variations in quality
and, particularly, health outcome as a potential explanation for observed costs (Newhouse, 1994,
Jacobs et al., 2006). As a consequence, high quality hospitals may be incorrectly deemed inefficient
and vice versa.
Since April 2009, all providers of publicly-funded care in the English National Health Service (NHS)
are required to collect patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) for four elective procedures:
unilateral hip and knee replacements, varicose vein surgery, and groin hernia repairs (Department of
Health, 2008a). Standardised questionnaires, including both generic (the EQ-5D) and condition-
specific instruments, are collected from all eligible inpatients before and 3 or 6 months after surgery.
Building on this initiative, this paper has two aims. First, we wish to explore to what extent variation in
health outcomes are associated with observed cost variation in the provision of care that remains
after controlling for case-mix and production constraints. Second, we investigate whether the new
information on health outcomes changes our judgement of provider cost performance. We perform
sensitivity analysis to assess the degree to which our findings depend on the choice of PROM
instrument.
Our empirical approach is to estimate multilevel models that recognise the clustering of patients within
providers. We use these repeated observations of the hospitals production process to distinguish
random noise from systematic cost variation attributable to effort for which the provider can be made
accountable. This approach differs from those typically employed in hospital efficiency studies in that
it does not require us to specify a production possibility frontier; a task that has been frequently
criticised in the past for its distributional assumptions and its sensitivity to modelling choices
(Newhouse, 1994, Skinner, 1994). Furthermore, by focussing on single production lines with
homogeneous products (e.g. hip replacement surgery) our analysis is less likely to violate the
underlying assumption of a common production function across providers (Harper et al., 2001). Our
patient-level data also allow us to control for case-mix more thoroughly than otherwise possible in
classical single-level regression models.
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2. Conceptual framework
Social systems are often sufficiently complex to require a less-informed principal to delegate a task to
a specialised agent in return for some reward
1
. The principals objective is to ensure the publicly-
funded services are of adequate quality and delivered in a technically efficient manner. The potential
agency problems arising in such situations are well known (Lafonte and Tirole, 1993) and occur when
principal and agent have different objectives or value them differently and the agents effort is
unobserved. These information asymmetries allow agents to misreport effort and pursue their own
objectives.
One way of mitigating the problem of misreporting is to improve the information base by undertaking
comparative cost analysis. The problem is that when agents are heterogeneous with respect to their
products and production processes, simple comparison does not suffice. Indeed, one would thus
expect that variation in cost is the norm rather than the exception (Jacobs and Dawson, 2003, p.
204). Any conclusions drawn from a naïve benchmark that does not account for such exogenous
factors and product characteristics would therefore be biased and the principal risks misjudging
relative performance.
In order to obtain unbiased estimates of the agents efforts, Shleifer (1985, p. 324) proposes multiple
regression of costs on legitimate characteristics that make firms differ, and correct[] for this
heterogeneity. The natural framework for such regression analysis is the industry cost function that
underlies all agents production processes. In line with the literature on hospital costs (e.g. Street et
al., 2010), we can specify the hospital cost function asܥ = ܥ(ܻ,ݍ, ݎ,ݓ,ܼ, ݁) (1)
where Y is a vector of outputs, q is a measure of quality of care provided, r and w are price vectors for
capital and labour, Z is a vector of environmental factors that constrain the production process and e
is the level of effort exerted.
One potential source of variation in production costs is provider heterogeneity with respect to range
and mix of outputs. Hospitals do not produce one homogeneous good or service. Even within patient
groups receiving the same health care intervention, certain patients will require more attention and
resources than others because they suffer from more severe conditions or differ with respect to other
factors that determine treatment costs, e.g. age, gender or number and type of comorbidities. As a
consequence, overall output of a hospital is better described as a mixture of different outputs, each of
which is defined by the underlying severity of the patients. Unless patients are randomly allocated to
hospitals, some providers may attract a more favourable case-mix than others and achieve similar
costs while exerting less effort. It is therefore crucial to correct for output heterogeneity in order to
allow for fair comparison.
A second reason why production costs may differ across hospitals is because some providers face a
more adverse production environment than others. For example, hospitals may differ in their access
to factor markets and they may pay different prices for capital and labour inputs. Some of this
variation in input prices is arguably not within the providers control but determined by location or the
existing infrastructure.
Production costs may also differ across hospitals because of variations in quality of care. Hospitals
may be able to reduce the rate of hospital acquired infections by devising efficient quarantine
strategies or improve the outcome of surgery by employing experienced surgeons. Assuming that
such quality initiatives are costly and their results are not readily observed by the regulator, providers
may have incentives to reduce quality below some standard and misreport the cost savings as
resulting from high effort (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998). Conversely, hospitals may claim that
higher costs are the result of better quality, not low effort. As long as the regulator cannot prove the
first or verify the latter, any cost performance assessment will be inherently incomplete.
1
Such agency relationships exist not only between institutions (e.g. regulators and hospitals) but as well within institutions (e.g.
management and medical staff) (Harris, 1977). A better understanding of variations in effort amongst health care institutions is
therefore crucial for policy makers and local managers alike.
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So far, the ability of comparative cost studies to account for quality variation has been limited by its
multi-dimensional nature and the inherent difficulties of measurement. Ideally, one would like to
measure the effect of hospital treatment on each patients outcome, i.e. the change in health status
induced by health care. Existing measures of output quality focus on the negative extreme of the
outcome spectrum (e.g. mortality, re-admission, adverse events) but fail to account for improvements
in health. In contrast, PROMs allow measuring variation across the entire spectrum and can be used
to determine the production costs of health improvement.
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3. Econometric approach
3.1. Estimating provider cost functions
Most comparative cost analyses are based on hospital-level cost functions. The limitations of this
approach are long established (Newhouse, 1994). In this study, we follow the recent literature on
patient-level cost functions that recognise the inherent clustering of patients in hospital production
lines (e.g. Dormont and Milcent, 2004, Olsen and Street, 2008, Laudicella et al., 2010). The rationale
for this approach is simple: observed hospital output is the sum of all patient treatment. Each patient
has specific medical needs that require the provider to alter their production process and tailor care to
the individual (Harris, 1977, Bradford et al., 2001). At the same time, production constraints and
provider decisions with respect to the general setup impact to varying degrees on all patients.
Examples include the cost of cleaning services or the price of labour. This implies that the cost of
each patient reflects both the individual contribution of case severity and the contribution of general
cost driving factors. By specifying the cost function at the level of the patient, we can incorporate both
specific and general effects in our analysis and control more comprehensively for patient and provider
heterogeneity.
We estimate multilevel models with provider-specific intercepts for each of the four PROM conditions
(Rice and Jones, 1997, Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Patients form the micro (i.e. level 1) observations
and hospitals constitute macro (level 2) units. We identify the systematic cost variation at macro level
that cannot be explained by case-mix, production constraints and the quality of care provided and
interpret this unobserved provider heterogeneity as variation in effort.
We specify our empirical model as follows:ܥ௜௝ = ߙ଴ +ࢄ௜௝ƍ ߚ + ࢆ௝ƍ ߜ +ܪ௝଴ ƍߴ + ?ࡴ࢐ƍߠ + ߛ௝ + ߝ௜௝ (2)
where ܥ௜௝ is the cost of care2 for patient ݅ ൌ ?ǡǥ ǡ ௝݊ in hospital ݆ ൌ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܬ. The vector ࢄ௜௝ contains
case-mix controls that vary at micro level and ࢆ௝ is a vector of production constraints at macro level.
The average initial health status
3
of the providers patient population is given by the scalar ܪ௝଴,
whereas average health gain is denoted as ?ࡴ࢐. ߙ଴ denotes the common intercept term. Unexplained
variation is decomposed into two components: i) a random error term ߝ௜௝ that varies at micro level and
is assumed to be distributed as ߝ௜௝ ?ܰ(?ǡ ߪఌ) and ii) a provider effect ߛ௝ that captures unobserved
heterogeneity at macro level. The provider effects can be interpreted directly, representing the
amount of cost deviation from the population average. Accordingly, if ߛ௝ < 0 the provider has lower
average costs than would be expected given the characteristics of its patients and the constraints it
faces, and vice versa.
In order to assess the sensitivity of provider rankings and estimates of effort to the addition of PROM
information, we estimate an alternative model where health outcome information is excluded, i.e. ߠ is
restricted to be zero. We compare estimates of ߛ௝ obtained from the full and restricted models to
identify providers for which a naïve benchmark without quality controls provides misleading
assessments of cost performance.
3.2. Modelling unobserved heterogeneity
The econometric literature emphasises two classes of models that can be applied in the case of
unobserved cluster heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002). Fixed effect (FE) models are most common in
panel data econometrics and treat the provider effect ߛ௝ as parameters to be estimated from the data.
Random effects (RE) models make the additional assumptions that all ߛ௝ are identically distributed
random variables and are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
2
We use the natural unit of costs instead of the logarithmic transformation. Results are very similar to those obtained from a
GLM with log link and gamma / poisson distribution. This is in line with previous findings that linear models with identity link
perform well in large samples (Deb and Burgess, 2003, Montez-Rath et al., 2006, Daidone and Street, 2011).
3
We did not have access to patient-level PROM data at the time of this study and, hence, base our model on publicly available,
averaged PROM data.
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Fixed effect estimators (e.g. within or LSDV) provide consistent estimates of the ߚ parameters
independently of the true underlying model. The price for this consistency is that FE estimators only
utilise within-cluster information. In contrast, random effects estimators exploit both within- and
between-cluster variation and are therefore generally more efficient. However, they are biased when
the assumed exogeneity of explanatory variables conditional on the unobserved effect does not hold.
When confronted with clustered data, economists tend to favour the less restrictive fixed effects
approach over random effects. Interest is usually confined to the unbiased estimation of ߚ and
unobserved heterogeneity is seen as a nuisance rather than of interest in itself. However, for the
proposed comparative cost analysis, we believe that a random effects approach is preferable for three
pragmatic reasons.
Firstly, both FE and RE models produce estimates of ߚ that are virtually identical. On statistical
grounds, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of unbiasedness for the hip and knee
replacement models. However, we find that coefficients differ in the magnitude of £1 - £2; a difference
that is statistically but not economically significant. We conclude that bias is a trivial concern.
Secondly, random effects estimators allow for direct modelling of macro level effects such as
production constraints and quality of care. In a fixed effects approach, these effects cannot be
included because they would be perfectly collinear with the indicator variables or washed out as part
of the within transformation. Some studies have employed Estimated Dependent Variable (EDV)
models to circumvent the problem (Lewis and Linzer, 2005, Laudicella et al., 2010), where fixed
effects are obtained from a first-stage regression and subsequently regressed on macro-level
covariates. However, this additional regression step makes the results less readily interpretable, adds
complexity and modelling uncertainty, is less efficient and requires analysts to use (or even invent)
ad hoc methods to correct their second-step regressions (Beck, 2005, p. 458). A random effects
framework is better suited for the type of analysis that we propose and a common choice in multilevel
studies
4
.
Thirdly, in the random effects approach, the provider effects ߛ௝ are typically not directly estimated from
the data but predicted from the underlying distribution of the random variables (Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesketh, 2009). This method is known as Empirical Bayes (EB) estimation and combines prior
information about the parameter values with the information available from the data to obtain posterior
means
5
. The resulting estimates of the provider effects (and their confidence intervals) are shrunken
towards the mean of the prior distribution, where the amount of shrinkage is determined by the
strength of information in the data. When information is sparse, i.e. the number of micro units within a
macro unit is low, the posterior means resemble the mean of the prior more closely. Conversely, for
macro units containing much information (i.e. large ௝݊), the results are primarily driven by the data and
shrinkage is minimal. Fixed effects estimation does not allow for such shrinkage.
The advantages of Empirical Bayes estimation and shrunken provider effects have long been
recognised in the literature on school effectiveness (Aitkin and Longford, 1986, Goldstein, 1997) and
more recently in the performance assessment of health care providers (Bojke et al., 2011). Shrinkage
is a form of precision-weighting and is therefore a valuable mechanism to account for uncertainty in
estimates for hospitals treating a small number of patients. Indeed, shrunken estimates are shown to
have lower mean squared prediction error than non-shrunken estimates obtained from fixed effects
estimation and are best linear unbiased predictors in linear models with random effects (Efron and
Morris, 1973). We believe that shrinkage is desirable in practical applications. It concentrates the
discussion on those providers for which we can draw conclusions about their cost performance based
on sufficient data but does not require us to set arbitrary inclusion cut-offs with regard to cluster size.
4
We have estimated such EDV models and found results to be comparable. Our conclusions seem robust to the choice of
approach.
5
Unlike a fully Bayesian approach, the prior is formed by the distribution of the random variables where the unknown variance
is replaced by its estimate. This contrasts to the Bayesian convention where the prior reflect ex-ante knowledge about the
distribution and should be formed before seeing the data.
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4. Data
4.1. Hospital Episode Statistics
Our study uses patient level data extracted from the Hospital Episode Statistics database (HES) for
the financial year 2009/10. HES contains detailed information about care provided to all patients
treated in NHS hospitals. The unit of observations in HES is the episode of care under the supervision
of one consultant (finished consultant episode (FCE)). In order to obtain the full level of patient
information documented across the inpatient stay, we link all associated FCEs and create provider
spells (Castelli et al., 2008). We select only those spells in which eligible PROM procedures have
been performed (see NHS Information Centre (2010, pp. 22-28) for inclusion criteria). Further, we
restrict our analysis to NHS providers due to the poor quality of data submitted by the independent
sector (Mason et al., 2010).
All patients are allocated to a Healthcare Resource Group (HRG v.4). By design, HRGs are expected
to explain a substantial amount of variation in observed costs. The grouping algorithm used by the
NHS Information Centre (NHS IC) assigns HRGs to each FCE. We extract information on the HRG of
the episode in which the (first) relevant PROM procedure has taken place and construct indicator
variables for the ten most frequent HRGs. All other observations are grouped in the category Other
HRG. The most frequent HRG is set as base category in the regressions.
The construction of any classification system necessarily requires a trade-off between parsimony and
homogeneity of the resulting groups. As a consequence, HRGs are unlikely to capture all variation
across providers. Hence, we include a set of variables that are based on diagnostic codes (ICD-10)
and procedure codes (OPCS-4.5). These include the main reason and type of surgery (PROM-
specific), whether it was a primary or revision surgery, and the weighted Charlson index as a measure
of co-morbidity (Charlson et al., 1987). Further, we generate counts of non-duplicate, secondary
diagnoses and procedure codes within a spell as further controls for co-morbidities and complications.
We account for patient demographics by sorting patients into age quintiles and create an indicator
variable for male gender. To characterise the inpatient stay itself, we construct indicator variables for
transfers in and out of hospital, whether the patient is discharged home or not, multi-episode spells
and in-hospital mortality.
We construct variables that capture the influence of observed characteristics of the provider and
production environment that are likely to constrain the production process. Larger providers may be
able to realise economies of scale and we generate a measure of size based on the count of patients
treated by the provider. To address economies of scope, we create an index of specialisation that
reflects the dispersion of HRGs treated within the hospital (Daidone and DAmico, 2009). The index
resembles a Gini index and is bound between zero (no specialisation) and one (all patients of hospital
j fall into one HRG). Finally, hospital trusts are categorised into teaching and non-teaching facilities
based on the classification system adopted by the National Patient Safety Agency (2009).
4.2. Reference cost
Hospital Episode Statistics do not include information on the cost of care. However, NHS trusts are
required to provide information on their costs to the Department of Health for the annual compilation
of the reference cost schedule and calculation of reimbursement prices. We utilise the 2009/10 return
to construct patient-level cost data.
The reference cost report is implemented using a top-down costing methodology. Here, total hospital
costs are progressively cascaded down through a hierarchy of costing levels, starting at treatment
services, to specialities and finally to individual HRGs. Costs at HRG-level are reported separately for
departments and are further disaggregated according to admission type (day case, elective and
emergency care) and length of stay, where HRG-specific trim points are used to differentiate between
short, average and long inpatient spells. We map the reference cost to our sample according to the
algorithm documented in Laudicella et al (2010). In absence of an agreed methodology on how to
aggregate cost from FCE to spell level (Daidone and Street, 2011), we assign the cost of the FCE in
which the (first) PROM procedure has taken place.
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We adjust patient costs by the Market Forces Factor (MFF) specific to the provider. The MFF is an
index of relative prices for buildings, land and labour that is used by the English Department of Health
to adjust reimbursement for what is deemed unavoidable variation in input prices (Department of
Health, 2008b). By applying this index to the costs reported in the reference cost schedule, we can
wash out justifiable variation in input prices directly.
4.3. Patient-reported outcomes
Data from the PROMs programme cover April 2009 - March 2010 and are published at hospital-level
by the NHS IC for all providers of NHS-funded care. The data are obtained by surveying patients
before and after their operation. For each hospital, data are available about the average health status
pre-surgery, post-surgery, and the average change in health after treatment
6
.
The PROMs survey includes both generic and condition-specific instruments for which data are
reported separately. Table 1 summarises the PROM instruments used for each procedure that are
reported by the NHS IC.
Table 1: PROM instruments by procedure
Procedure
Condition-specific
PROM
Generic PROM
Months
following
surgery for post-
op data
collection
Unilateral knee-replacement
surgery
Oxford Knee Score
(OKS)
EQ-5D, EQ-VAS 6 months
Unilateral hip-replacement surgery Oxford Hip Score (OHS) EQ-5D, EQ-VAS 6 months
Varicose vein surgery
Aberdeen Varicose Vein
Questionnaire (AVVQ)
EQ-5D, EQ-VAS 3 months
Groin hernia repair - EQ-5D, EQ-VAS 3 months
The EQ-5D is a generic PROM comprising a set of questions asking patients to indicate whether they
have no, some or severe problems on five dimensions (mobility; self care; usual activities;
pain/discomfort; anxiety/depression). These responses are used to describe a patients EQ-5D health
profile. That health profile is summarised using utility weights
7
obtained from members of the general
public (Dolan 1997), anchored at 1 (full health) to 0 (dead), with scores < 0 indicating states
considered worse than being dead. The patient also provides their own assessment of their overall
health state on a visual analogue scale  the EQ-VAS  from 0 to 100 (worst to best possible health,
respectively).
The condition-specific Oxford Hip and Knee Scores consist of 12 questions, each of which requires
responses on a 5-point severity scale. Equal importance is given to all questions and summary scores
range from 0 (worst) to 48 (best). The Aberdeen Varicose Vein Questionnaire (AVVQ) contains 13
questions and scores between 0 and 100. In contrast to the aforementioned instruments, higher
scores on the AVVQ indicate worse health states.
6
The NHS IC also provides these averages adjusted for case-mix. However, because we undertake our own case-mix
adjustments, we used the unadjusted data.
7
Note that as a foundation in utility theory is not strictly required for comparative cost analysis, as it is for economic evaluation,
then both utility weighted profiles and EQ-VAS scores are candidates for summarising patients overall health status in a single
number.
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5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
We present descriptive statistics in Table 2.
Each of the four conditions is sufficiently populated to allow for precise estimation of case-mix effects
at patient level. In contrast, the number of providers is comparably low (125 to 147 hospitals),
reinforcing the value of multilevel analysis as compared to traditional hospital-level analysis.
Furthermore, we observe large variations in cluster size within and across production lines. One
would thus expect that provider effects are estimated with varying degrees of precision and that
shrinkage can contribute to a more conservative assessment of hospitals efforts.
The cost of care varies considerably across providers for each of the four procedures. For example,
for knee replacement surgery we observe average costs of care by provider that range from below
£2,000 to more than £10,000. High cost cases are not confined to one or two providers. Rather, we
observe that many hospitals report costs for patients in excess of two standard deviations above the
national average. This suggests that these cases are truly high-cost cases and not artefacts of the
way local accounting system operate or how costs are assigned to patients. We therefore retain all
observations in our sample and do not trim outliers based on observed costs.
The generic nature of EQ-5D and EQ-VAS allows for comparison of health outcomes across
conditions. Patients undergoing hip or knee replacement surgery experience substantially larger
increases in health status than those receiving groin hernia or varicose vein surgery. This is
consistent with the less serious nature of the underlying conditions. We observe disagreement
between EQ-5D and EQ-VAS on the direction of health change for the latter groups of patients.
Whether this is a result of aggregation or a genuine difference between instruments cannot be
explored with our dataset.
5.2. Regression results
5.2.1. Baseline estimates
Table 3 presents regression results from a model with EQ-5D outcome information. The reported
standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
We find significant coefficients on the majority of HRG variables (not reported). This indicates that the
current reimbursement system is able to distinguish between different types of patients and their
expected costs. Several other patient characteristics explain costs over and above the allocated HRG.
For example, we observe an age effect and find that certain types of main diagnoses and procedures
are significant predictors of treatment costs. Costs are higher for patients that undergo more
procedures or suffer from a higher number of comorbidities as well as for patients that are transferred
in or out of hospital or not discharged to their usual place of residence.
The results at provider-level are less clear cut. The average cost of patients treated in teaching
hospitals is generally higher than in non-teaching hospitals but the effect is statistically significant only
for groin hernia repair. We do not find conclusive evidence that NHS hospitals realise positive
economies of scale or scope within production lines. This is somewhat surprising given the substantial
differences in volume and, to a lesser degree, specialisation observed across providers for each of
the four conditions.
With respect to PROM data, we find that the coefficient on initial health status shows the expected
negative sign for three out of four conditions but is only statistically significant for the two orthopaedic
procedures. Patients that present with higher health status at admission require fewer resources than
patients in worse conditions; a result that seems intuitively correct. The relationship between health
gain and costs is negative in all four models. This would indicate that some providers are able to
secure greater health gains and provide care at lower cost than other providers. However, no results
are statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.
Truly inefficient or providing better quality of care? 9
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Knees Hips Hernia Veins
Variable Description Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Patient characteristics
costMFF Cost of care, adjusted for MFF 6135.69 2075.01 6335.04 2107.82 1518.77 727.97 1246.27 567.08
patage Patient age 69.37 9.64 68.71 11.47 59.08 17.26 50.36 14.72
male =1 if male patient 0.43 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.91 0.28 0.38 0.49
trans_in =1 if transfer from another provider 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02
disdest_other =1 if discharge to location other than 'home' 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04
death =1 if death during inpatient stay 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
trans_out =1 if transfer to another provider 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01
multiepi =1 if multiple FCEs within spell 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04
opertot Number of secondary procedures 1.40 0.96 1.48 1.13 1.19 1.65 0.56 1.07
diagtot Number of secondary diagnoses 2.53 2.19 2.52 2.28 1.38 0.73 1.55 0.91
wcharlson Weighted Charlson index 0.41 0.72 0.38 0.79 0.22 0.60 0.10 0.34
PROM-specific variables
Number of indicators for main procedure 6 8 7 4
Number of indicators for main diagnosis 5 5 0 5
Provider characteristics
teaching_status =1 if teaching hospital in 2008-09 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.39
procedure_volume Number of patients with PROM procedure 431 236.23 384 229.30 390 185.83 185 153.33
spec_index Specialisaton index 0.34 0.10 0.34 0.10 0.34 0.08 0.33 0.07
OKS_hg Oxford Knee Score - Health gain 14.47 1.92 - - - - - -
OKS_q1 Oxford Knee Score - Initial health status 18.40 1.78 - - - - - -
OHS_hg Oxford Hip Score - Health gain - - 19.48 1.98 - - - -
OHS_q1 Oxford Hip Score - Initial health status - - 17.56 1.71 - - - -
Aberdeen_hg Aberdeen Varicose Vein Score - Health gain (*) - - - - - - -8.67 2.37
Aberdeen_q1 Aberdeen Varicose Vein Score - Initial health status (*) - - - - - - 19.59 2.67
EQ5D_hg EQ-5D (descriptive system only) - Health gain 0.29 0.07 0.41 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.05
EQ5D_q1 EQ-5D (descriptive system only) - Initial health status 0.39 0.07 0.34 0.07 0.79 0.03 0.77 0.05
EQVAS_hg EQ-VAS - Health gain 3.07 3.83 8.74 4.95 -0.93 1.92 -0.48 3.05
EQVAS_q1 EQ-VAS - Initial health status 67.68 4.35 65.19 4.12 79.92 2.58 80.43 4.03
Number of observations
and cluster size
Number of observations at patient-level 60804 53318 57352 23096
Number of observations at provider-level 141 139 147 125
Minimum cluster size 14 37 1 4
Average cluster size 431 384 390 185
Maximum cluster size 1307 1181 975 904
(*) Lower score / negative change is better
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Table 3: Regression results (EQ-5D)
Knees Hips Hernia Veins
Variable b SE p-val b SE p-val b SE p-val b SE p-val
Intercept 8262.5 1308.9 0.000 7211.0 1961.1 0.000 1593.0 924.4 0.087 704.4 816.7 0.390
age_cat2 25.2 11.7 0.032 18.8 19.5 0.334 13.1 6.5 0.043 21.9 7.6 0.004
age_cat3 -9.5 21.2 0.655 55.0 21.1 0.009 27.8 7.7 0.000 9.9 6.8 0.150
age_cat4 14.3 17.6 0.415 44.9 23.6 0.057 63.4 9.6 0.000 22.6 10.1 0.025
age_cat5 70.6 15.7 0.000 85.7 26.1 0.001 145.9 15.0 0.000 30.5 13.0 0.019
male -11.6 8.1 0.150 -7.6 15.2 0.620 -22.8 11.6 0.049 22.0 5.3 0.000
trans_in 1655.8 686.5 0.016 1451.6 465.0 0.002 661.5 223.9 0.003 46.4 217.8 0.831
disdest_other 130.5 76.9 0.090 225.7 54.6 0.000 377.3 98.9 0.000 103.8 66.4 0.118
death -343.1 353.7 0.332 -164.8 291.4 0.572 754.4 431.0 0.080 . . .
trans_out 323.5 93.6 0.001 145.3 92.5 0.116 513.5 211.5 0.015 -354.7 195.9 0.070
multiepi -125.8 68.7 0.067 -349.3 117.1 0.003 202.4 53.4 0.000 298.8 136.6 0.029
opertot 156.0 21.6 0.000 172.1 28.0 0.000 78.4 14.7 0.000 11.1 6.4 0.082
diagtot 24.1 5.6 0.000 45.8 7.4 0.000 34.2 5.2 0.000 22.6 5.9 0.000
wcharlson -4.6 9.5 0.623 -15.6 16.2 0.334 55.2 9.7 0.000 0.0 12.3 0.999
PROM-specific effects not reported
teaching_status -47.4 414.3 0.909 463.6 401.4 0.248 198.3 81.2 0.015 103.9 85.4 0.224
procedure_volume -0.3 0.6 0.658 0.6 0.6 0.349 -0.4 0.3 0.222 0.1 0.2 0.815
spec_index 42.3 815.9 0.959 1630.8 769.6 0.034 -59.3 693.8 0.932 318.8 432.5 0.461
eq5d_q1 -5122.5 2476.3 0.039 -5024.5 2681.9 0.061 -144.7 1298.0 0.911 447.0 1015.0 0.660
eq5d_hg -767.3 2246.5 0.733 -1884.0 3292.5 0.567 -250.4 1405.6 0.859 -231.3 871.1 0.791
sigma_u
1092.0 1049.9 392.2 383.5
sigma_e
1223.3 1355.7 523.2 381.6
rho
0.44 0.37 0.36 0.50
N
60804 55318 57349 23096
J
141 139 147 125
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Table 4: Sensitivity analysis - Functional form and PROM instruments
PROM Model
Health
gain
Knees Hips Hernia Veins
b p-val ¨$,& b p-val ¨$,& b p-val ¨$,& b p-val ¨$,&
cond.-
spec.
linear hg -52.6 0.420 2.0 45.1 0.613 1.7 - - - -14.8 0.460 1.1
squared
hg 338.2 0.141
1.0
-2655.0 0.001
-17.8
- -
-
-144.1 0.042
0.2
hg
2
-13.9 0.071 68.7 0.001 - - -7.4 0.063
EQ-5D
linear hg -767.3 0.733 3.0 -1884.0 0.567 0.2 -250.4 0.859 2.0 -231.3 0.791 1.6
squared
hg 2834.9 0.376
4.0
-37292.0 0.024
-5.2
-4976.4 0.143
1.8
788.2 0.673
3.2
hg
2
-7602.0 0.269 44490.0 0.038 26966.0 0.142 -5026.0 0.501
EQ-VAS
linear hg -78.8 0.033 -2.0 -59.6 0.149 -5.8 -10.5 0.546 1.7 18.2 0.129 0.0
squared
hg -122.8 0.006
-3.0
-125.0 0.037
-5.8
-9.1 0.616
3.6
27.0 0.014
-1.1
hg
2
6.2 0.186 4.3 0.207 1.4 0.742 4.4 0.020
1RWHǻ$,&LVWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQ$,&EHWZHHQIXOODQGUHVWULFWHGPRGHOLHDPRGHOWKDWGRHVDQGGRHVQRWFRQWUROIRUKHDOWKJDLQ1HJDWLYHQXPEHUVLQGLFDWHEHWWHUILW
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5.2.2. Sensitivity analysis  source of PROMs data
In order to test the stability of our findings, we scrutinise two modelling choices: First, we re-estimate
the various models using EQ-VAS and condition-specific PROMs. While there are good reasons to
prefer generic instruments over condition-specific instruments, for example because the former
facilitates broader comparisons across disease areas, one should not a priori exclude the latter for
this type of analysis. Second, we test for a parabolic relationship between health outcome and costs
as previously reported in the literature (Hvenegaard et al., online first). The Akaike Information Criteria
(AIC) is used to compare the fit of the full and restricted model, where improvements in model fit are
indicated by negative changes. Results of this sensitivity analysis are summarised in Table 4.
We find a negative linear relationship between health gain and costs for knee replacement surgery
when outcomes are measured via EQ-VAS. The statistical significance of this specific model is re-
emphasised by the improvement in AIC. However, we do not find support for this result with regard to
the other two PROM instruments nor any of the other procedures.
In contrast, we find stronger evidence of a non-linear relationship between health gain and costs for
hip replacement surgery using either Oxford Hip Score or utility-weighted EQ-5D. The estimated
relationship is U-shaped with initially negative marginal effects that turn positive when average health
gain passes a saddle point. This suggests that those providers located on the downwards sloping side
of the curve could substantially improve health outcomes while reducing costs. In contrast, providers
on the upward sloping side can only achieve better outcomes by investing more resources.
For varicose vein surgery, the estimated relationship is positive and exponential for the EQ-VAS and
the Aberdeen Varicose Vein score, although the latter is only jointly statistically significant. One may
interpret this as the right-hand side of the U-shaped relationship that we observe for hip replacement
surgery.
5.3. Impact on provider effects
We now turn to the assessment of providers efforts to contain cost. We illustrate our results with the
example of hip replacement surgery and the Oxford Hip Score.
Figure 1 shows the Empirical Bayes estimates of the provider effects and their corresponding
confidence intervals as obtained from models with linear and squared OHS health outcome terms
(full model) and without health outcome information (restricted model). Hospitals to the left of the
graph have lower average costs than hospitals to the right. Average national costs are normalised to
zero.
We find substantial differences in provider effects after accounting for case-mix, production
constraints and health outcomes. The best hospital has risk-adjusted production costs that lie about
£6,350 below the national average, whereas the most expensive hospital deviates from the average
in the opposite direction by a similar amount. However, these differences in costs, while substantial,
do not seem to be driven by variation in health outcome. Comparing the estimates of the full and
restricted model, we find that, for the vast majority of hospitals, the additional quality information does
not result in different judgements with regard to their relative cost performance. Only four hospitals
experience statistically significant changes in their estimated provider effects as indicated by non-
overlapping confidence intervals when comparing estimates from the two models. Unsurprisingly,
these hospitals are at the top and bottom of the outcome spectrum and, hence, are influenced most
from specification of the exponential relationship between costs and quality. Furthermore, two of
these four hospitals are located on the downward sloping side of the cost-quality curve, i.e. produce
poor outcomes at high costs. We believe that regulators or purchasers of care should not amend their
judgement about these hospitals. By allowing for a non-linear relationship between cost and quality
and controlling for the latter, one effectively explains away systematically higher costs for these
providers or, put more plainly, rewards them for bad performance. Hence, the change in provider
effect is not driven by legitimate economic reasons, but merely a result of over-adjustment.
Results for the other models are reported in Appendix 1. Again, we do not find estimates of hospital
cost performance to be greatly affected by the addition of health outcome information.
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Figure 1: Provider effects for hip surgery  OHS
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6. Discussion and conclusions
The aim of this paper is to measure cost variation in the provision of four selected surgical procedures
under special consideration of differences in the quality of care provided. Our work builds on a new
policy initiative by the English Department of Health to collect patient-reported health outcomes using
generic and condition-specific instruments. This study is a first attempt to incorporate health outcomes
into comparative cost analysis and explore whether this new measure of quality changes judgements
about the relative performance of NHS hospitals. We make a case for multilevel modelling with
precision-weighting and highlight the advantages of this technique over other approaches to
performance measurement.
Our results suggest that systematic cost differences exist across hospitals in the provision of surgical
procedures that is not due to either patient or production process characteristics. Some of the
variation in costs can be associated with the average health outcome and we find evidence of a non-
linear relationship between cost and outcomes for hip replacement and varicose vein surgery. For a
handful of hospitals, such health outcome adjustment leads to a statistically significant improvement
in their estimated cost performance. However, we have argued that the economic judgement should
differ depending on whether the hospital is located on the positive or negative slope of the cost-quality
curve and that one should be aware of the risk of over-adjustment.
Several implications for policy makers and future research arise from our results. First, the impact of
health outcome information on provider rankings and estimates of cost containment effort is, at best,
minimal. This casts doubt on claims that might be made by some hospitals that their higher production
costs are a consequence of investing in better care that produces better health outcomes. That said,
our analysis is restricted to outcome information averaged at provider level and it will be interesting to
see whether this finding still holds for analyses that utilise patient level outcome data.
Second, our study has only explored the association between cost and health outcome, but cannot
ascertain causality. Future work should aim to overcome this limitation and specifically account for the
potential endogeneity.
Third, if the relationship between cost and quality is indeed non-linear, pay-for-performance and
quality bonus programs have to acknowledge non-constant marginal costs and set different prices for
different health outcomes. If the association between outcomes and cost is negative or non-existent
(see e.g. groin hernia repair) then quality bonus payments of any form should be understood as
incentive payments in excess of production costs. The way in which quality incentive schemes are
designed might therefore be quite different for different conditions and depend on the observed
association between costs and outcomes. In some cases, a purchaser or commissioner will need to
reimburse the additional costs of production in order to allow providers to break even whereas in the
other cases non-financial incentives may suffice.
Fourth, at this early stage of the PROM initiative and on the basis of our preliminary analysis, we
cannot single out a preferred PROM instrument that should be applied exclusively in future analyses
of hospital cost performance. We therefore recommend using both generic and condition-specific
instruments and conducting sensitivity analysis with regard to the choice of PROM instrument as we
have done here.
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8. Appendix 1
Condition PROM Model
Provider effects
Sign. changes in
effects
min max stat. econ.
Knees
EQ5D linear -£ 3,897 £ 6,983 - -
squared -£ 3,766 £ 6,968 - -
EQVAS linear -£ 4,674 £ 6,408 - -
squared -£ 4,574 £ 6,521 1 0
OKS linear -£ 4,005 £ 6,772 - -
squared -£ 3,943 £ 6,722 1 0
Hips
EQ5D linear -£ 6,821 £ 7,428 - -
squared -£ 6,532 £ 7,057 1 0
EQVAS linear -£ 6,620 £ 7,723 - -
squared -£ 6,506 £ 7,833 2 0
OHS linear -£ 6,628 £ 7,050 - -
squared -£ 6,326 £ 6,445 4 2
Hernia
EQ5D linear -£ 1,019 £ 1,765 - -
squared -£ 989 £ 1,782 - -
EQVAS linear -£ 1,021 £ 1,782 - -
squared -£ 1,014 £ 1,789 - -
Veins
EQ5D linear -£ 694 £ 1,258 - -
squared -£ 694 £ 1,241 - -
EQVAS linear -£ 802 £ 1,240 - -
squared -£ 789 £ 1,247 1 1
Aberdeen linear -£ 814 £ 1,229 - -
squared -£ 671 £ 1,188 - -
